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Abstract 
 
This paper provides a critical analysis of the World Bank’s new thinking on 
industrial policy.  After outlining the changing perspectives on industrial policy 
put forward by the World Bank over the last three decades, we argue that the 
bank’s economists have taken one step forward (the approval for the enhanced 
role of the state) but also one if not two steps backward (by strong 
encouragement to countries to seek their current comparative advantage in 
pursuing industrial policy). We argue that a critical analysis of the World 
Bank’s policy stance on industrial policy as on other main issues is essential 
because of the institution’s hegemony in policy analysis of economic 
development as well as its conditionality, which may now well include what 
this paper regards as its inappropriate industrial policy.  The analysis in the 
paper combines classical contributions on international trade and the world 
economy, relevant economic history, as well as Krugman’s comments on these 
issues in terms of modern economic analysis. The paper concludes with 
reflections on the appropriate industrial policy for developing countries that the 
World Bank should support. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
As many commentators have noted, in advanced countries structural 
unemployment, globalisation and the integration of poorer East European 
countries into the European Union have led to some concepts of industrial 
policy being revived (Aiginger, 2007). Similarly, in developing countries after 
two decades of the Washington consensus, which banished industrial policy 
from polite discourse, there has been recently some renewed interest in the 
subject by the Bretton Wood institutions. A main protagonist in the debate on 
industrial policy in developing countries has been the World Bank with its 
traditional negative attitude towards such polices. However, the recent 
appointment of Justin Lin as the Chief Economist of the World Bank has led to 
a major change in the Bank’s analysis of the appropriate industrial policy for 
emerging, developing and transitional countries.  
 
The main aim of this paper is to provide a critical analysis of the World Bank’s 
new thinking on industrial policy following the debacle of the Washington 
consensus.  As we shall see in arriving at their new formulation the World Bank 
economists go back to first principles.  The critique, which will be presented 
here, will also deliberately go back to the first principles and draw on the work 
of classical economists, modern economic theory as well as economic history. 
In order to motivate the discussion the first part of the paper will outline the 
changing perspectives on industrial policy put forward by the World Bank over 
the last three decades.  We will find that although the bank’s economists have 
indeed now taken one step forward (the approval for the enhanced role of the 
state) it will be argued here they have taken at least one if not two steps 
backward (by strong encouragement to countries to seek their current 
comparative advantage in pursuing industrial policy). The World Bank 
implicitly encourages developing countries to seek unconditional openness to 
the world economy. It will be appreciated that a critical analysis of the World 
Bank’s policy stance on industrial policy as on other main issues is essential 
because of the institution’s hegemony in policy analysis of economic 
development as well as its conditionality, which may now well include what 
this paper regards as its inappropriate industrial policy.   
 
Compared with its traditional policy stance the World Bank’s new thinking 
makes a major new concession on the role of the state in industrial 
development. However the Bank’s hallowed injunction to developing countries 
to get their prices right and to seek their comparative advantage remains intact. 
The presumed purpose of this injunction is to enable developing countries to 
reap full benefits from free international trade and finance. 
2 
 
 
In a recent debate with Ha-Joon Chang, Justin Lin outlines the World Bank’s 
new approach to industrial policy very succinctly as follows: ‘I shall argue that 
industrial upgrading and technological advance are best promoted by what I call 
a facilitating state – a state that facilitates the private sector’s ability to exploit 
the country’s areas of comparative advantage… the key is to make use of the 
country’s current comparative advantage – not in the factors of production that 
it may have some day, but in the factors of production that it has now’ (Lin in 
Lin and Chang 2009: 2).  This proposition and the associated economic policy 
framework will be challenged in this contribution on the basis of comprehensive 
economic and historical analysis.  The analysis of the paper supports that of 
Chang in Lin and Chang (2009) but it highlights rather different aspects of 
disagreement with Lin. 
 
The present paper is organised as follows.  It first reports (section 2) on the 
traditional World Bank approach to industrial policy, as well as on the related 
question of economic openness.  This account is based on two of the World 
Bank’s well known seminal contributions (1991 and 1993) to the theory and 
practice of economic development including industrial policy.  It also discusses 
the evolution of the World Bank’s industrial policy as a consequence of the 
Asian crisis of the late 1990s.  Section 3 gives an account of the World Bank’s 
new analysis of what is the best industrial policy for developing countries based 
on Lin (2009) in Lin and Chang (2009).  Section 4 is the heart of the paper 
where a critique of the World Bank’s prospective policy and its theoretical 
underpinnings are presented in the light of reflections from the history of 
economic thought as well as economic theory and history.  This analysis 
combines classical contributions from Ricardo, Marshall, Keynes and Passinetti 
on international trade and the world economy, relevant economic history, as 
well as Krugman’s comments on these issues in terms of modern economic 
analysis. The paper concludes with reflections on the appropriate industrial 
policy for developing countries that the World Bank should support.1 The 
concluding section will also include a brief discussion on the important issue of 
industrial policy after the current financial crisis. 
 
2.  Evolution of the World Bank’s Industrial Policy Perspectives 
 
To appreciate the full significance of the World Bank’s current thinking on 
industrial policy, it is best to start with the Bank’s two seminal documents, 
(World Bank 1991, 1993). The two provide a comprehensive account of the 
Bank economists’ thinking on development problems and their conclusions on 
public policy. The 1991 Development Challenge is important because, in the 
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words of the then President of the World Bank, Mr Barber Conable, it 
‘synthesises and interprets the lessons of forty years of development 
experience’ by Bank economists. The significance of the 1993 East Asian 
Miracle lay in the fact that the Bank economists invariably justified their policy 
advice to developing countries around the world by reference to the experience 
of the sustained fast growth of the East Asian economies. However, the two 
studies complement each other and need to be considered together. The first 
provides the Bank’s general analytical framework and its broad market-oriented 
approach to development issues. The second argues that, notwithstanding heavy 
government intervention in East Asia, the experience of these countries was still 
compatible with the 1991 Report’s recommendation of a ‘market-friendly’ 
approach, and therefore did not necessitate any significant departures in the 
Bank’s policy advice.  
 
The starting point for the Development Challenge was the question:  why 
during the last four decades were some developing countries successful in the 
sense of substantially raising their per capita incomes whilst others were not?  
The central analytical argument was that economic growth is determined 
essentially by the growth of total factor productivity of capital and labour.  The 
Development Challenge’s analyses came to the conclusion that the more open 
an economy, the greater the degree of competition and the higher its investment 
in education, the greater would be its growth of total factor productivity and 
hence its overall economic growth.  Although the significance of the 
international economic factors was recognised, a major argument of the study 
was that domestic policy matters far more for raising per capita incomes than 
world economic conditions. 
 
The Development Challenge stated:  ‘Economic theory and practical experience 
suggest that (government) interventions are likely to help provided they are 
market-friendly’ (p. 5).  In order for ‘market-friendly’ not to be a mere 
tautology, the study, to its credit, defined the concept fairly precisely in the 
following terms: 
a) Intervene reluctantly.  Let markets work unless it is demonstrably better 
to step in...  [It] is usually a mistake for the state to carry out physical 
production, or to protect the domestic production of a good that can be 
imported more cheaply and whose local production offers few spill over 
benefits. 
 
b) Apply checks and balances.  Put interventions continually to the 
discipline of international and domestic markets. 
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c) Intervene openly.  Make interventions simple, transparent and subject to 
rules rather than official discretion. 
 
Overall, the state’s role in economic development in this ‘market-friendly’ 
approach was regarded as being important but best limited to providing the 
social, legal and economic infrastructure, to creating a suitable climate for 
private enterprise, but also, significantly, to ensure a high level and appropriate 
composition of human capital formation. Even this limited role for the state 
was, nevertheless, an advance over the earlier neoclassical thinking which 
enjoined governments simply to avoid distortions, and just provide a stable 
macro-economic environment and a reliable legal framework. 
 
Both the neoclassical and the ‘market friendly’ analyses encountered serious 
intellectual difficulties since neither could satisfactorily explain the outstanding 
success of East Asian economies. Heterodox authors, such as Amsden (1989), 
Wade (1990) and Singh (1995) pointed out at the time that, contrary to the 
World Bank, in countries like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, the government 
played a leading and a heavily interventionist role in the course of their 
economic development.  
 
The Development Challenge stated, ‘The central question of this Report is why 
countries like Japan have succeeded so spectacularly while others have failed.’ 
Singh (1995), therefore, suggested that the relevant issue was to what extent, if 
any, the Japanese followed the Report’s prescriptions and a ‘market-friendly’ 
approach to development. Did the Japanese government intervene in the 
markets ‘reluctantly’: did it for example leave the prices and production 
priorities to be determined by the market forces and simply provide the 
necessary infrastructure for private enterprise to flourish? How ‘transparent’ 
was the government intervention in Japanese industry? To achieve this colossal 
economic success, how closely did the Japanese economy integrate with the 
world economy?  
 
The Development Challenge did acknowledge the inescapable fact that there 
was considerable government intervention in the course of post-War Japanese 
development. The important issue, however, is whether the Report’s 
characterisation of this intervention and lessons to be drawn from it were valid. 
Singh called attention to the overwhelming evidence which showed that the 
governments in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan did not intervene (a) either 
reluctantly or (b) transparently in any of these economies. Specifically, in their 
periods of fast economic growth, the governments in Japan (1950-73) and South 
Korea used a wide array of interventionist instruments including: import 
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controls; control over foreign exchange allocations; provision of subsidised 
credit, often at negative real interest rates, to favoured firms and industries, 
among other measures.   
 
Singh concluded that between them, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan did all the 
things which the ‘market-friendly’ approach to development was not supposed 
to do. Above all, all three countries followed an ‘industrial strategy’- a set of 
policies to deliberately change the market prices and production priorities - 
which was explicitly ruled out by this approach. The Development Challenge 
acknowledged that there was significant state intervention in all these three 
countries but argued that ‘these economies refute the case for thorough going 
dirigisme as convincingly as they refute the case for “laissez-faire”’ (p.5). 
Heterodox economists agree that the experience of these countries is certainly 
an argument against laissez-faire; nor does it provide any support for 
‘command’ planning for production of the Soviet-type, which in effect 
supplants the market altogether. However, for mixed economy developing 
countries with strong governments, these economists suggested that the post-
War East Asian economic history was unequivocally an argument for adopting 
an industrial strategy, for guiding the market, and not following the hands-off 
‘market-friendly’ approach as enunciated in World Bank (1991). 
 
As a response to these criticisms,2 the World Bank’s (1993) second volume on 
the East Asian Miracle produced a new analysis of the economic development 
of the high performing Asian economies (HPAEs) including Japan. This study 
fully acknowledged the facts of enormous government interventions in these 
countries. Thus, the Report: ‘policy interventions took many forms - targeted 
and subsidised credit to selected industries. … Some industries were promoted 
while others were not’ (World Bank, 1993: 6).  However, the Report went on to 
suggest that such interventions, particularly in the sphere of industrial policy, 
had in general a limited effect. Some of these worked for some of the time in a 
few countries, but overall they were neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
extraordinary success of these countries. 
 
To sum up, the Bank’s second stage study (World Bank, 1993) fully accepted 
that the government had a large role in these economies, but insisted that the 
industrial policies were largely ineffective. At the policy level, the Bank made 
no concessions at all, emphasizing that the essential lesson of the East Asian 
experience was to get the prices right and to follow the country’s comparative 
advantage. However, at the theoretical level, the East Asian Miracle study 
represented a major advance in the thinking of its economists. For example, the 
close business-government relationship of the East Asian economies was 
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rationalized in terms of the so-called deliberation councils, which, it was 
suggested, in the real world of incomplete and missing markets improve welfare 
by co-ordinating investment decisions. Similarly, the performance standards 
imposed by these governments on business were interpreted in terms of export 
contests and contingent contracts, which were conducive to economic 
efficiency. 
 
At the next stage, in the wake of the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s, the 
Bretton Woods institutions totally changed their perspective and suggested that 
this crisis was a disaster waiting to happen in view of the dirigiste model of 
capitalism which East Asian countries had all along been following. IMF (1997) 
in particular argued that whatever the immediate triggers for the crisis (for 
example, the short term macroeconomic imbalances or property market 
bubbles), its ‘deeper’ causes were ‘structural’. These derived effectively from 
the Asian model of capitalism which led to cronyism, over-investment, lack of 
competition and disregard for profits. Therefore, in its adjustment programmes 
for the crisis affected Asian countries, the IMF’s conditionality required 
fundamental structural changes in the existing systems of corporate governance, 
labour laws, the relationship between banks and business, and capital market 
regulation both internal and external. In short, the Fund preferred Asian 
countries not only to radically alter their traditionally close 
government/business relationships, but to have a much diminished role for the 
government in economic activity altogether. 
 
3.  The World Bank’s New Industrial Policy 
 
It is against this background of anti-state, anti-traditional industrial policy 
thinking which pervaded the Bretton Woods institutions during much of the 
1990s and 2000s that one has to assess the changes in attitudes towards 
industrial policy, which have been provided by Justin Lin in the Chang-Lin 
debate3.  
 
In the new World Bank thinking the state has a totally different and highly 
positive role in economic development. Lin in Lin and Chang (2009a: 6) 
suggests that: 
 
neither of us questions the importance of a major state role in promoting 
economic development. Perhaps this is because in the countries we know 
most intimately – China and South Korea – a crucial ingredient in growth 
was a capable and largely developmentally oriented state. The issue is 
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identifying the key role played by the state in those countries and other 
rapid developers. 
 
This recognition of the positive role of the state in economic development is a 
major step forward. However, as we shall soon see, it is qualified in a serious 
way. The purpose of the state is to help firms and enterprises identify a 
country’s existing comparative advantage and to guide productive activity in 
that direction. Mr. Lin’s ‘facilitating state’ therefore is mainly concerned with 
helping the private sector explore its comparative advantage.  
 
Justin Lin notes in Lin and Chang (2009: 3): 
 
In summary, these severe market failures can provide a rationale for 
government intervention to kick start growth.  But what kind of 
intervention?  The key to answering this question is recognising that the 
optimal industrial structure is endogenous to the country’s endowment 
structure – in terms of its relative abundance of labour and skills, capital, 
and natural resources. Upgrading the industrial structure requires first 
upgrading the endowment structure, or else the resulting industrial 
structure will become a drag on development. Therefore the 
government’s role is to make sure that the economy is well launched on 
this endogenous process of upgrading. 
 
Although Lin accepts a much greater role for the state in economic policies 
including industrial policy, in other ways his message is deeply conservative. 
Essentially what he is arguing is that countries should integrate with the world 
economy and produce according to their comparative advantage. 
 
He argues that this is the only sure way of pursuing sustainable economic 
development. The comparative advantage-defying policies will inevitably fail 
because they will be too expensive, either for the private entrepreneurs or for 
the government. From this observation he draws the conclusion that countries 
should integrate with the world economy to benefit from world trade and 
finance and that by implication the optimal development strategy is free trade 
and capital movements.  
 
Lin recognizes the fact that there are many examples to the contrary where the 
countries have defied comparative advantage and been extra-ordinarily 
successful. Japan and Korea are leading examples of comparative advantage 
defying policies. Japan first and then Korea started producing steel when their 
per capita income was only two and a half percent of the US per capita income. 
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Lin’s recommendations for developing countries’ integration with the world 
economy gives in extreme form the doctrine of getting the prices right. Lin does 
not go as far as suggesting that getting the prices right is enough for a country to 
be lifted out of poverty into high rates of economic growth. He has the state 
play an important role in resolving externalities, remedying incomplete 
information with respect to products and processes and co-ordination of plans of 
economic agents. However, the underlying paradigm of free trade and free 
capital movements as being the optimal strategy for the world economy is 
implicit in his analysis.4 
 
It will be argued in the following sections that this is an ahistorical view, which 
is extremely misleading and could harm developing countries rather than help 
them.  The operational question for developing countries is what is the optimum 
degree of openness for an economy.  The motivation for this question comes 
from the fact that economic openness is a multi-dimensional concept. A country 
can be open, or not so open to all or some of the following: trade, exports, 
imports, finance, science, culture and education, migration, foreign investment, 
investment by its citizens and companies abroad, among other things.  There is 
no economic theory that suggests that a country has to be open in all dimensions 
simultaneously. Given its economic and geopolitical situation, a country may 
choose to be open in some areas and not in others.  The relationship between 
‘free trade’ and optimal degree of openness will be discussed in the following 
two sections. 
 
4.  Optimal Degree of Openness: A Historical and Analytical Approach   
 
In principle, one can approach the problem of defining the optimal degree of 
openness in two mutually non-exclusive ways.  To start with, an obvious 
method is to use the theory regarding national planning.  This involves drawing 
up a suitable model for the economy that would include the specification of an 
appropriate social preference function (or more generally, a functional), along 
with the relevant constraints.5  These constraints will typically consist of the 
quantification of opportunities to transform primary factors into desired 
commodities through either production or trade.  Boundary conditions could be 
inserted to lend the results a greater degree of realism.  The ‘optimal degree of 
openness’ will follow as a consequence from the exercise of constrained 
maximization.  The analysis can be cast in static or dynamic terms. The solution 
variables involve production and /or investment levels by sectors as well as 
exports and imports. They can be stated as time paths if the relevant model is a 
time-phased one. 
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Typically such exercises are carried out in real terms and leave the set of 
complementary monetary magnitudes undetermined.  These are usually worked 
out with the help of a macroeconomic model.  There is a considerable literature 
on this subject and with increasing ability to handle complex optimization 
models on more powerful computers, it led to some improvements compared 
with the initial exercises carried out by Chenery, Bruno and several others in the 
late fifties.6 
 
However, there may be many reasons to believe that the approach is not entirely 
satisfactory. While a planning approach does avoid easy and facile 
identification of the optimal degree of openness with a regime of ‘free trade’ it 
suffers from a number of limitations. First of all, the postulate of a scalar maxim 
may be quite inappropriate unless the degree of homogeneity is extended to 
future generations as well, not a very realistic assumption, to put it mildly. 
Secondly, the analysis cannot take into account issues connected with 
irreversibility over time excepting by resort to very ad hoc procedures. 
 
Thirdly, the only bit of connection of this approach with history is through 
initial specification of vectors of primary factors, which are easily quantifiable. 
There are no simple and convenient ways of quantifying the states of 
knowledge to the community or its degree of absorptive capacity if inflows of 
factors from the outside world are considered to be relevant. 
 
Fourthly, national planning models are rich in details for a single country. 
However to be operationally meaningful they have to assume that the rest of the 
world is either going to stay constant or change only in a predetermined way. 
Strategic choices are excluded.  
 
Structural changes arising from conjunctural shifts in the world economy may 
also not come out from the model results as sharply as one would like. 
 
If one were to take these criticisms seriously, then the alternative to planning 
exercises would be a somewhat looser but a more historically grounded 
approach which not merely emphasizes the advantages that are likely to accrue 
to a national entity from exploring opportunities to trade with the rest of the 
world but also emphasizes certain factors which may make it more vulnerable 
to outside influences.  These may produce long term irreversible effects on the 
country’s pattern of production and its ability to generate productive 
employment. 
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Such an alternative approach is quite consistent with the paradigm of classical 
economics, including in this respect not only Ricardo, but also Marshall in his 
capacity as a classical economist. Contrary to textbook analysis it is important 
to emphasize here that Ricardo was much more concerned with the effects of 
foreign trade on the rate and pattern of accumulation, than with the mere 
demonstration of the theorem of  `comparative advantage’, as an exercise in 
static optimization. When Ricardo pleaded for a greater degree of openness of 
the British economy, he was not being guided merely by his artificial example 
of trade in cloth and wine between England and Portugal, but because of the 
need to capitalize on the emerging features of the British economy in the light 
of revolution in textiles production. Marshall understood this very well when in 
his ‘Memorandum on the fiscal policy of international trade’, he wrote  ‘The 
principles on which our present fiscal system was based sixty years ago seem to 
me to be not ultimately derivative.  They were obtained by applying certain 
truths, which are as universal as the truth of geometry or mechanics, to certain 
conditions which were transitional’ (Marshall, 1926: 386).  He displayed a clear 
understanding of the historical specificity of maxims of policy of free trade 
which have been treated by many as ahistorical truths. 
 
While Marshall clearly recognised how the changes in configuration of 
production forces can alter the degree and character of openness of the 
economy, Keynes, it would appear, was worried about a somewhat different set 
of factors when he was devoting his thoughts to working out schemes for post-
war national reconstruction. This has to do with maintaining equilibrium in the 
balance of payments of different countries. As he once put it, ‘ To suppose that 
there exists some smoothly functioning automatic mechanism of adjustment 
which preserves equilibrium if only we trust to methods of  “laissez-faire” is a 
doctrinaire delusion which denigrates the lessons of historical experience 
without having behind it the support of sound theory’ (Keynes, 1980; pp.21-22). 
Now it is clear that in history there have been periods, which as Keynes himself 
acknowledged, payments arrangements have worked out satisfactorily. This 
permitted large expansions of trade and trade-induced growth. However these 
have been episodes that have been characterised by the presence of suitable 
conjunctures, as the study of the economy for the period after the Second World 
War, the ‘golden age’, demonstrates (Glyn, Hughes, Lipietz and Singh, 1992). 
 
A country wishing to open up when the conjuncture is adverse in Keynes’ sense 
(that different economies are characterized by ‘persistent surpluses’ or ‘deficits’ 
without there being any mechanism to restore global equilibrium) may benefit 
much less and, in certain cases, may end up being much worse off than if its 
opening-up process were differently timed. 
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If timing makes a difference, and timing is indeed important, and if returns to 
scale are increasing, openness by virtue of assuring higher levels and growth 
rates of external demand may facilitate major structural changes in the economy 
and permit labour productivity and the per capita consumption level to increase 
over time. If on the other hand, the timing is wrong, a country may have to go 
through painful processes of adjustment precisely because it is more ‘open’ than 
otherwise. 
 
This would once again suggest that we ought to deal with the problem of 
openness in terms of rate and pattern of growth of output with due recognition 
to carry out structural changes as and when circumstances so warrant. These 
time-related and conjunctural specific aspects which have considerable bearing 
on the desirable forms of  ‘openness’ lead us to adopt an approach which is 
different from that which is usually adopted in formal planning models. 
 
5.  Arguments for Free Trade - A Critical Review   
 
In terms of neo-classical analysis the optimal degree of openness is given by the 
concept of free trade. Arguments in favour of the ‘free trade’ position can be 
stated in a compact manner by referring back to the two ‘fundamental theorems’ 
of welfare economics. These theorems become relevant to the present discourse 
if one realizes that ‘trade’ can be considered as a means of production. To bring 
out the relevance of these theorems to this analysis, one would further follow 
Arrow and Hahn (1971) in as much as one would assume that domestic factor 
supplies can be treated as factors ‘private’ to a particular group of firms. This is 
the device that they employ to handle problems related to foreign trade within 
the ambit of general competitive equilibrium analysis.7  Factors as usual, can be 
treated as products with a negative sign. According to the first ‘welfare 
theorem’ a competitive equilibrium, in the absence of externalities and no 
satiation, constitutes a Pareto optimum. The so-called ‘converse theorem’ is, 
however, more important from our point of view and makes much more 
stringent demands. According to this ‘converse theorem’, otherwise known as 
the ‘second theorem of welfare economics’, a Pareto-optimum can be realized 
as a competitive equilibrium in the presence of all round ‘convexity’, provided 
suitable lump sum transfers can be arranged amongst the participants. 
 
If these assumptions hold, then the second theorem is indeed a useful one from 
the planning point of view. If the economy is a small open one, and competitive 
equilibrium exists in the world at large, then the, country is better off under 
‘free trade’ than under any restricted form of trade, let alone autarky. Only 
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when the country is large enough to face downward sloping demand curves in 
the world market, may it be concluded that there is a first best argument for 
deviation from free trade. This is the essence of the so-called ‘optimum tariff’, 
argument. However, the result is applicable to a single country only if the rest 
of the world behaves as if it were passive and not engaged in retaliation in one 
form or other. On this argument, earnings of internationally immobile factors 
are in the nature of rents, that is, they are price-determined. They can fall to 
zero, as in the case of domestically available unskilled labour, under 
inappropriate demand conditions. It is assumed, however, that national 
authorities can take care of this problem by arranging suitable domestic 
compensatory income transfers, a tall order indeed. 
 
What are the sources of major departures from the assumptions underlying the 
above theorem?  An obvious difficulty is caused by non-convexities and 
increasing return to scale.  Proofs of the existence of competitive equilibrium in 
situations involving non-convexities lack generality and are often highly 
restricted in nature. 
 
What can be concluded in regard to ‘free trade’ policy in the light of pervasive 
increasing returns? Paul R. Krugman, who is a leading trade theorist and Nobel 
Prize winner, has in an earlier survey article addressed himself precisely to this 
issue (Krugman, 1987). Krugman noted the work of Dixit, Spence, Stiglitz and 
others who tried to model trade in the context of Chamberlin-type imperfect 
competition along with the presence of increasing returns.  He carefully noted 
that in the type of ‘second-best’ world, which alone is relevant in the 
contemporary context, there is no automatic tendency for gains from trade to be 
realised.  While the scope of gains from trade does not necessarily go down, the 
composition of trade changes significantly from inter-industry to intra-industry 
trade.  Furthermore the need for government intervention can no longer be 
ignored.  Thus, it is clear from his survey that the discussion of trade policy has 
taken a new turn in contrast to the earlier literature where increasing returns and 
market imperfections were often relegated in trade textbooks to the status of 
inessential modifications of the central argument couched in the context of the 
Hecksher-Ohlin paradigm. 
 
While Krugman himself ends up with a justification for free trade, he noted that 
‘this is not the argument that free trade is optimal because markets are efficient.  
Instead, it is a sadder but wiser argument for free trade as a rule of thumb in a 
world whose politics are as imperfect as its market’ (Krugman, 1987: 143).  
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The main reason behind Krugman’s cautionary ending is that sophisticated 
interventionism is likely to be a difficult exercise in political economy.  
However, in essence, it is difficult to expect, for the reasons that he has 
elaborated as well as for others, for the world trading system to gravitate to free 
trading as a generally accepted rule of thumb.  Instead the argument is better 
viewed in terms of the need for ‘managed trade’.  However, it is necessary to 
explain this notion in a little detail. 
 
There are several reasons why trade needs to be managed.  These have to deal, 
in a basic sense, with the fact that ‘openness’ can be a mixed blessing.  The 
point was well understood by John Maynard Keynes when he changed his 
position from being a champion of free trade to that of an advocate for ‘national 
self-sufficiency’ in the midst of depression during the 1930s. 
 
‘Openness’ can be found to be a great advantage for an economy for any of the 
following reasons: 
 
a) It may enable a country to concentrate its relatively specialised 
resources in areas of production where the world demand is highly 
income and price elastic; 
 
b) It may lead to diffusion of knowledge of the kind leading to 
considerable upgrading of the quality of local factors of production; 
 
c) It may lead to sufficient competitive pressure to eliminate certain 
forces of what Leibenstein has described as X-inefficiency; 
 
d) Trade may lead to changes in the distribution of income which can 
lead to a greater share of production accumulation in national income; 
 
e) Trade may facilitate what Schumpeter and, following him, Dahmen 
have stressed so much – namely an accelerated process of creative 
destruction. 
 
In all these cases, we are assuming that payment arrangements are such that 
there is no sizeable deflationary bias in the world economy or in any of the 
leading countries.  It was already noted above that Keynes was of the view that 
the classical theory of equilibrating payments arrangements was gravely 
deficient.  The Bretton Woods system was meant to provide a mechanism that 
coordinated high levels of effective demand amongst trading countries.  The 
system lasted over the period 1945-71 in the ‘mutilated’ form that was 
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acceptable to the major parties involved.  Since then the world economy and its 
institutional arrangements have evolved.  Coincidentally the world finds itself in 
the midst of the biggest economic downturn since the great depression of the 
1930s. 
 
Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that there are situations in which 
increasing the openness of the economy may harm the quality of locally 
available factors.  This leads to the opposite syndrome to that which we 
mentioned earlier.  An infamous example of the adverse impact of trade 
liberalisation is that of the 19th century trade in textiles between machine-made 
materials from Britain and hand-made Indian cotton textiles. This led to huge 
unemployment of hand weavers which imbalanced the whole Indian agrarian 
economy.  This is because the unemployed weavers were thrown back on the 
land, reducing further the land-man ratio.  
 
Generally, it has been seen that ‘openness’ works positively if the phenomenon 
of ‘learning’ from contacts with the rest of the world is suitably 
institutionalised, and through suitable adaptation on the policy side involving 
appropriate government interventions which make the domestic economy more 
responsive to change.  The experience of Japan and that of the Asian NICs 
would seem to suggest that home market expansion can often trigger off 
growth-promoting investment which then leads sequentially to import and 
export substitution on highly efficient lines.  In its turn, home market expansion 
may have much to do with increases in food productivity level. Arthur Lewis 
also strongly underlined the importance of food productivity growth as a 
method of overcoming the terms of trade loss suffered by many tropical 
countries that concentrated their exports of beverages, etc. to cater to 
metropolitan markets. 
 
In the absence of a growing home market accompanied by suitable 
diversification of the industrial structure, the effect of ‘openness’ can at best be 
a ‘once-for all gain’ from increased openness.  On occasion it may lead to a 
subsequent accentuation of the economic difficulties of the country that 
liberalized its trade and investment policies in the expectation of sustained 
growth but without adequate preparation on the knowledge-absorption side. 
 
It is important at this stage to pinpoint the phenomenon of learning over time as 
a more relevant paradigm for development gains through trade as distinct from 
the neoclassical emphasis on exploitation of arbitrage opportunities. John Stuart 
Mill was fully aware of this dimension in his classical writings on the subject, 
as was Alfred Marshall whose ‘Memorandum of Fiscal Policy of International 
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Trade’ was mentioned earlier.  More recently, L.L. Pasinetti has always been 
very emphatic on this point. (Pasinetti, 1981: chapter 11) 
 
To drive home this point, it is worth quoting the following paragraph from 
Pasinetti: 
 
The primary source of international gains is international learning (not 
international trade), where firms in one country are challenged by lower-
priced products from abroad.  They will either learn how to cut down costs 
or close down.  Some of them, at best, may learn and survive.  
Furthermore, when a new product is invented in one country, the very first 
thing that all other countries will try to do is to learn how to make the 
product themselves (by buying licenses and paying royalties, if necessary).  
Only in the temporary learning period, or in the period which may 
sometimes be quite long in which internal demand is not yet big enough to 
allow the minimum scale required by the new methods, will [the product] 
normally be produced in all countries.  The case of agriculture and mining 
is quite different. (Pasinetti, 1981: 259)  
 
To sum up, while the classical and neoclassical arguments for ‘free trade’ suffer 
from serious conceptual and operational difficulties, there are indeed 
substantive benefits from ‘economic openness’, which are more robust than the 
traditional neoclassical arguments.  However they can be realised only in a 
specific world economic conjuncture coupled with an appropriate set of 
domestic policies, which institutionalise learning.  Instead of focussing on 
current comparative advantage, the World Bank’s new industrial policy should 
attempt to encourage economic openness on a case-by-case basis. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
There are two kinds of conclusions that follow from the above analysis.  The 
first relate to industrial strategy, economic openness and strategic integration of 
a country with the world economy as well as the timing of these events.  The 
second relate to the implications of the above analysis for industrial policy, after 
the crisis.  We start with the latter subject, which is important not least because 
it is one of the main themes of a forthcoming special issue of the journal Policy 
Studies.  
 
Industrial policy in the post crisis period raises rather different questions for 
emerging countries than for developed countries.  The first point of note is that 
many developing countries have been very little affected by the crisis.  
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Countries like India, China and Brazil have continued to record strong growth 
rates and have not suffered sharp downturns of the kind experienced by the US, 
UK and Eurozone countries.  Therefore the post crisis scenario for the rich and 
the poor countries are going to be rather different.8 
 
However there is one important area in which the problems in the two groups of 
countries are necessarily intertwined.  This is the question of global financial 
imbalances, particularly those relating to US and China, but also including other 
countries such as India, Japan and oil exporting countries.  It is generally agreed 
that from a global perspective countries like China and India should rely more 
on internal than on exports or external demand for their future growth, while the 
opposite is the case for the US, UK and the Eurozone countries.  To achieve this 
rebalancing speedily and in a coordinated way it is best to use industrial policy.  
Relying on market forces to generate the desired structural changes would be a 
very slow process whilst what is required are decisive steps towards balancing 
the world economy.  It would be in the interests of both rich and poor countries 
to co-operate and co-ordinate industrial policies for this purpose (see further 
Izurieta and Singh (2010) and Cripps, Izurieta and Singh (forthcoming)). 
 
I turn now to the second type of conclusion, which relates to the main theme of 
this paper, the World Bank’s new industrial policy.  As we have seen in the 
previous sections, after two decades of the rejection of industrial policy in 
favour of a market friendly approach to development the World Bank 
economists have recently undertaken a comprehensive review of policies under 
this rubric.  They have taken a big step forward by recognising the crucial role 
governments play in economic development in particular in the making of the 
East Asian miracle.  The chief economist of the World Bank notesthat  ‘a half 
century later, it remains true that there are few if any examples of governments 
that have succeeded with a purely laissez-faire approach that does not try to 
come to grips with market failures, and far more examples of rapid growth in 
countries whose governments have led effectively.  Therefore, it is incumbent 
upon policy-makers and researchers to identify the most effective ways of 
promoting the productivity growth and change in industrial structure necessary 
for development’ (Lin, in Lin and Chang (2009: 3)).   
 
However, under the World Bank’s new industrial policy the chief task of the 
government is to help industry or firms to discover their current comparative 
advantage and act accordingly.  This is the old story of close integration with 
the world economy through trade liberalisation.  This paper has argued on the 
basis of the writings of the classical economists, modern economic theory as 
well as economic history that this approach may hinder rather than help 
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developing countries.  While under realistic assumptions the case for free trade 
and current comparative advantage suffers from serious empirical and 
conceptual shortcomings, there is a much better and far more robust case for 
economic openness which neoclassical theorists usually ignore.  Instead of 
current comparative advantage the World Bank should assist developing 
countries in pursuing an optimal degree of economic openness according to 
their individual circumstances. Rather than close integration with the world 
economy, developing countries should seek strategic integration that enables 
them to integrate up to the point where it is in their interests to do so.  This was 
the strategy followed by the East Asian Miracle countries.  The World Bank’s 
new industrial policy would be a sure step forward if it assists developing 
countries to achieve similar strategic integration with the world economy. 
18 
 
Notes 
 
1 In writing this paper I have used the updated material from Singh 1995 and 
2002. 
 
2  Apart from these academic attacks on the World Bank’s theses on the East 
Asian economies, there was, importantly, criticism from the Japanese 
government. See Shiratori (1993) and Lall (1994).  
3 This paper assumes that perspective put forward by Lin in the Chang-Lin 
debate is intended to be operational in due course. Justin Lin is not only the 
chief economist but also the Senior Vice-President of the World Bank and 
therefore writes with the full authority of his office.  
 
4 In Lin and Chang (2009) the capital movements are not explicitly discussed 
but there is no ambiguity about the paradigm which he favours. 
 
5  This part of the paper is based on and updates unpublished notes written by 
the late Prof. Sukhamoy Chakravarty (an eminent economic planner) and 
myself.  Interested readers may obtain a copy of these notes by application to 
the author and to the World Institute of Development Economic Research 
(WIDER), Helsinki.   
 
6 See for example Arrow and Hurwicz (1977), Calsamiglia (1977), and Heal, 
(1973). 
 
7 See Arrow and Hahn (1971). They write: ‘We will find it convenient to 
consider some commodities as being private to a firm or group of firms (e.g. 
managerial ability or in the case of foreign trade, domestic factor supplies)’. 
 
8 On these issues see further Singh and Zammit forthcoming.  See also the 
Special Issue of the Cambridge Journal of Economics on the crisis (June 2009). 
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